The common law’s fictional contrivance to treat “substantial certainty” of harm as equivalent to an intention of harm, for purposes of liability in battery and the other intentional torts, is in part an implicit recognition that substantially certain injurers are often no less culpable than intentional injurers and thus properly exposed to a similar scope of liability. To be sure, this fictional contrivance serves multiple ends; so, for example, substantial certainty can function as an evidential proxy for an actual intention of harm, thus obviating the difficulties that might attend a plaintiff’s attempt to establish that the defendant actually intended her harm. But such a function could also be served by treating substantial certainty as raising an extremely strong but defeasible inference of actual intent and imposing upon the defendant the burden of undercutting this inference. That no such modification of the current regime has been entertained is some further indication that the fiction also serves other ends.
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Макрон сделал заявление об ударах ИранаПрезидент Макрон призвал Иран прекратить удары и открыть Ормузский пролив
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